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which he was under no moral obligation to resist. The agreement
which he has entered into under such circumstances, cannot be said
to be binding. By tendering back the consideration, if any has
been received, the law should place him in statu quo. No obliga-
tion can be of any force, if the assent of one of the parties to it is
wanting; and an assent not voluntarily given is no assent in law.
We accordingly submit that it would harmonize conflicting autho-
rity and establish a principle in accordance with the present ad-
ministration of law, if courts of justice would pay regard to the
following propositions
1. That any unlawful threats amount to duress per minas,
sufficient to avoid a contract or agreement, if such contract or
agreement would not have been entered into, if the threats had not
been used.
2. That the question whether a contract or agreement was
entered into through fear, is a question of fact, for the jury to
decide in each individual case, and that therefore it would be
erroneous for a judge to charge as a principle of law, that the
duress, in order to avoid the obligation, must have been such as
was calculated to overcome the will of a man of ordinary firmness
of mind. W. H. PHILLIPS.
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IN Coleman v. Wathen, 5 Term R. 245 in 1793,-which ap-
pears to have been the second case in the reports in which drama-
tic copyright or "stage-right," as it has been not improperly
called, came before the courts; it having been preceded only by
Macklin v. _Richardson, Arab. 694, in 1770-a new and elabo-
rate question arose, for which they were entirely unprepared.
In 31-acklin v. Richardson, Amb. 694, the plaintiff was author
of a farce entitled "Love d la Mode," in two acts, which was per-
formed by his permission several times at different theatres in suc-
cessive years, but never printed or published by him. When- the
performance of the farce was over, he had been in the habit of
taking the copy away. from the prompter; and whenever it was
played at benefits or on other particular occasions, plaintiff had
been in the habit of charging a certain sum for its performance, to
the beneficiaries on those occasions.
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Meanwhile the, defendants, who were proprietors and publishers
of a magazine, employed a short-hand writer upon several occa-
sions to proceed to the theatre and take down the words of this
play, and thereupon published the first act of "Love I la Mode"
entire, in an issue of their magazine; giving, also, at the same
time, notice that the second act would be contained in the succeed-
ing number. Lord Commissioner SMYTHE consented to enjoin
such publication, holding, very clearly, that the representation of
a play is not such a publication, or such a dedication of it to the
public as will destroy the author's rights therein as to a purely
literary composition; that is to say, that he would still possess the
right after such public representation, to publish and sell copies of
his composition, should he desire to do so. And neither would it
affect his right to its continued representation.
In Coleman v. Wathen, the plaintiff had purchased the copy-
right of a play or entertainment, known as "The Agreeable Sur-
prise," from its author, O'Keefe, the comedian, and proceeded to
represent it upon the stage of his theatre, when it was unexpect-
edly and concurrently produced and represented by the defendant
at a neighboring and rival theatre.
The name of the play itself seems to have been ominous, for,
upon the case coming into court, an "agreeable surprise" was in
store, not only for the plaintiff but for the law and for equity
itself. It appeared-how we are not told, but it seems to the satis-
faction of the court-that the defendant had obtained his copy of
the play by process, not of stenography, but of memory!
Upon this state of facts, and upon the ground, apparently, that
it would be carrying the power of courts to an absurd and ridicu-
lous degree, should they assume to enjoin exercise of a man's
purely mental function, the court, BULLER, J., held that no action
could lie, saying "Reporting anything from memory can never be
a publication within the statute. Some instances of strength of
memory are very surprising; but the mere act of repeating such a
performance cannot be left as evidence to the jury that the defend-
ant had pirated the work."
The whole opinion upon this novel and hitherto unconsidered
point, whose reasoning and conclusion has been implicitly followed
by courts and legal writers for the better part of a century, is
embraced in the few -words above quoted.
It is to be regretted that such is the case. It would have inter-
PIRACY BY MEMORIZATION.
ested the lawyer of the present day to have known from the re-
porter what points were raised by counsel, and to have learned by
what ingenious and ingenuous arguments they were able to induce
the learned and admirable Judge BULLER to enunciate the one soli-
tary case, in which stealing is not stealing; in which piracy is not
piracy, and in which theft is not theft.
The principle thus apparently occurring to the learned judge,
is undoubtedly a wise one,-we say apparently, for the entire re-
ported case, in the 5 Term Reports 245, is contained in thirty lines,
and no word is said about the evidence of the memorization, or as
to the principles involved. Indeed, the word "memory" occurs
but once, and then in the few concluding'sentences pronounced as
above, by BULLER, J.
Still, for all that, we say the principle which apparently occurred
to the learned judge, is undoubtedly a wise one. For, if courts of
justice can enjoin the memory of man, there would seem to be
nothing that they could not do. If one who, having witnessed a
play, or having read a treatise or a story, by repeating the argu-
ment of the same to others, can be obliged to respond in damages
or in equity to the author, who may fancy himself thereby deprived
of the profits which might have accrued to him, if those others had
been obliged to witness or to read for themselves, there would
scarcely be any limits to the investigation of courts. They would
soon find themselves obliged to discriminate between absolute and
partial repetitions, and between partial and temporary and abso-
lute injunctions against the exercise of a man's purely mental
faculties and processes, and to proceed to lengths of absurdity be-
yond all speculation.
But, on the other hand, if one, deliberately, for his own profit,
and to the end that the legitimate property of another shall be de-
stroyed or diminished, sets himself down to memorize that other's
dramatic or other composition; and if, after the laborious exercise
of his trained memory, and the attendance night after night at the
performance have enabled him to possess himself completely of
its whole-dialogue, actions, properties and all-he writes the same
out for the use and benefit of himself and a troupe of his own, who
thenceforward produce the same-if it be a play-with the same
title, scenery and effects, so that the real author or proprietor is
deprived of the fruits of his own labor, it is difficult to see the
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difference-in effeqt at least-between this and other piracies, in
which other channels of transportation have been employed.
There is scarcely any achievement of which the human memory
is incapable. Nor is it, possibly, more wonderful that one should
commit to memory a play, after a number of consecutive atten-
dances at its representations, and more or less familiarity with its
performance, than that he should be able to catch it so accurately
from the mouths of the aefors, and move his hand so nimbly to
and fro across a page, as to be enabled to carry away with him, in
black and white, the words which he has heard uttered by actors
upon a stage.
Both processes would appear to be the result of training. The
one, of the ear and hand, two physical members limited in their
action by certain physical laws; the other, of a purely mental and
incorporeal faculty, unrestrained by any laws, and as utterly limit-
less as thought itself. It is certainly hard to imagine a reason
why-when both of these faculties are turned to purposes of
wrongful appropriation of the lawful property of another-the
more volatile and potent faculty should be allowed to be used at
pleasure, while the other, and purely physical process, should be
restrained.
It certainly cannot be the policy of the law to permit a spolia-
tion, merely because it happen to be accomplished with unusual
skill, and by the exercise of a wonderful talent on the part of the
spoiler. If it is, then we must look contentedly upon the depre-
dations of the experienced housebreaker, who enters our dwellings
deftly and robs us neatly, and it is only of the clumsy thief that
we can make an example.
And again, if the feat of memorization releases from responsi-
bility for acts committed through its means, why should not the
principle obtain in the law of Defamation as well as in the law of
Piracy? Why should not one who hears defamatory and slander-
ous words spoken of his neighbor be allowed to repeat them at
pleasure, so long as he repeats them from memory, and so long as
he does not transcribe them, in the first instance, from paper ?
And, moreover, what provision must the law of evidence make
for the question ? Is the presumption to be in favor of or against
the memorization? And how is either presumption to be rebut-
ted ? The best evidence obtainable must of necessity be the de-
fendant's own unsubstantiated and impossible-to-be-impeached
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testimony. Since who else but himself can swear that he does or
does not repeat that which he repeats-from memory-or that he
transcribes what he transcribes in the solitude of his closet from
memory, or from stenographic or other notes ?
" When a literary work," said ALLEN, J., in Palmer v. De Witt,
47 N. Y. 532, "is exhibited for a particular purpose, or to a limit-
ed number of persons, it will not be construed as a general gift or
authority for any purpose of profit or publication by others."
In spite of the venerable precedent which, like an ancient land-
mark, has been so long left undisturbed, there would seem to be no
satisfactory reason why the dramatic author, or proprietor, like
every other, should not be permitted to retain his right in the
productions of his own brain and his own pen, until he relinquish
it by contract, or by some unequivocal act; indicating an intent
to dedicate it to the public. Lectures are not, by their public de-
livery or performance in the presence of all who choose to
listen to them, or to pay for the privilege of attending them,
so dedicated to the public that they can be printed and
published, without their author's permission, or diverted to
oljects for which he did not assign them: Bartlett v. Chittenden,
4 McLean 301. The manuscript and the right of the author
therein, are still within the .protection of the law the same as if
they had never been communicated to the public. in -any form.
This'principle is too well established in every other case than that
of memorization, which we are considering, to need any citations
to support it, and has been expressly enacted by statute in Great
Britain: 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 65.
If an author has any rights at all in his composition, or if courts
have any power to protect him in those rights, it is difficult, we
repeat, to see how the mere process employed in the piracy is to
take away that right or to cancel that power.
It is just possible that BULLER, J., did not mean to say exactly
what he has been understood as having said during these eighty-
nine years. The concluding words of his opinion, in five lines,
are: "The mere act of repeating such a performance cannot be -
left as evidence to the jury that the defendant had pirated the
work," which is, perhaps, self-evident, as is, also, the statement that
"some evidences of strength of memory are very surprising."
The gist of the decision is, however, supposed to be included in the
words: "Reporting anything from memory can never be a publi-
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cation within the statute" (meaning the first statute of copyright)
8 Anne, c. 19.
But he does not say that repeating, or delivering or aeting the
matter "1reported from memory," is not such a publication.
Clearly, courts cannot enjoin the memorization, nor, if they could,
could they enforce their injunction. A man can cultivate his
powers of remembering to almost any extent. We doubt if he can
extend, or if any court on darth could compel him to extend his
powers of forgetting. As a rule, efforts to forget are always in-
effectual, though efforts to remember are far from being always
crowned with success., In general, the law will regard the element
of deliberation as increasing, if anything, the responsibility for a
wrongful or doubtful act, but in this respect, as in all others, the in-
stance before us seems to negative every rule and animus of the
law. Surely that law cannot desire to fix such a premium upon
the exercise of a man's memory as to render it, in that instance
alone, oblivious' of the rights of others not only, but of its own
policy.
It is undoubtedly true that courts cannot enjoin a man's exer-
cise of his powers of memorizing what he hears or sees. It is quite
doubtful, even, if they would attempt to enjoin, either, the manual
labor of writing out the play so memorized, and the parting with
the manuscript for value. In Morris v. Coleman, 18 Yes. 437,
indeed, a court did enjoin the defendant from writing plays for a
particular theatre, but, probably, if the plays had never been repre-
sented, there would have been no interference.
But most assuredly it seems to us, could equity enjoin the pro-
duction upon the stage of a theatre of the play purloined by the
memorization with as much consistency as it enjoined the produc-
tion and representation in Macklin v. Bihardson, ubi supra, and
as it has been done in hundreds of cases since. Nay, more, it
seems probable that equity could enjoin even the individual actors
from performing a purloined play, since it has asserted the right
to enjoin an actor from performing any play whatever. The Su-
perior Court of the city of New York did not hesitate to enjoin
an actress, Miss Fanny Morant, from acting for a particular man-
ager, and that, too, in a case where it was apparent that the
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law: -Daly v. Smith, Albany
Law Journal, Sept. 19th 1874, p. 187.
Is it not barely possible that the above ruling of BULLER, J.,
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has escaped critibism more on account of the rarity with which
these cases of memorization occur; or, what is still more likely,
from the fact that when they occur they scarcely ever reach a
court where the principles they involve can be leisurely and care-
fully examined? Dramatic manuscripts, from the fact of their
immediate availability, without tarrying the expensive and labori-
ous processes of printing and manufacture, no less than because
of the attractiveness of the drama, which has been for three hun-
dred years the favorite amusement of the civilized world, have be-
come, perhaps, the most valuable of all literary compositions; and
mainly, too, because their value depends upon a season or a 1 run;"
the cases in which the law is called upon to interfere in reference
to them, make very little show in the reports or in the digests, and
very seldom get beyond a mere motion or two at a special term
or in Chambers. If the plaintiff obtains his preliminary injunc-
tion, defendants are usually permitted to settle, and the case ends.
There is but a single instance-so far as this writer is aware-
in which the question of memorization has come before an Ameri-
can court, and that case never was reported and never went beyond
the single motion for an injunction argued at chambers in the city
of New York. In Wallack v. Barney Williams, unreported, N.
Y. Supreme Court, 1st Dist. s. t. 1867, the plaintiff had brought
out the play of "Caste," at his theatre in the city of New York,
when the defendant, the manager of a rival theatre in that city,
also produced it. Upon the plaintiff's motion for an injunction
restraining this rival representation, upon the affidavit of the
principal actor, Mr. W. J. Florence, in the employ of defendant,
that he had obtained the version of the play used at defendant's
theatre by process of memorization. Upon the strength of Cole-
man v. Wathen, such injunction was refused.
But is not the principle, for all its undisturbed antiquity, one
vicious, and in contravention to well-known rules ? It is a cardi-
nal rule of the law that the parting with, by the individual, of his
own property, or ith the product of his own lawful labor, must
be by his own voluntary act, either actually or constructively ;
and it is almost too late in the day to attempt a distinction between
literary and any other property, so far as this principle goes.
There certainly can be no valid reason why the crafty, skilful or
unusual processes by which A. pirates B.'s property, should be con-
strued, on account of its unusual or marvellous nature, into a vol-
